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Abstract
This paper considers how the multinational corporations transfer price responds to changes in international corporate effective tax rates. It extends the
decentralized decision-making analysis of transfer pricing in the context of different tax rates. It adopts and extends Bonds (1980) model of the decentralized
multinational corporation that assumes centralized transfer pricing. The direction of transfer price change is as expected, while the magnitude of change is
likely to be less than predicted by the Horst (1971), centralized decision-making
model. The paper extends the model further by assuming negotiated transfer
pricing, where the analysis is partitioned into perfect and imperfect information
cases. The negotiated transfer pricing result reverts to the Horst (1971), or centralized decision-making, result, under perfect information. Under imperfect information, the centralized decision-making result obtains when top management
successfully informs division general managers or it successfully implements a
non-monetary reward scheme to encourage division general managers to cooperate. Under simplifying assumptions, centralized decision-making dominates decentralized decision-making, while negotiated transfer pricing weakly dominates
centralized transfer pricing.

The contents of this article are the opinions of the writers and do not necessarily represent the position of the Internal Revenue Service.

I.

Introduction

Profit-maximizing multinational corporations choose their transfer prices in connection
with international tax rates, since transfer prices influence global after-tax profit. Transfer
prices also concern the tax authorities, since they influence a country’s tax revenue. The
transfer price values the good or service traded between divisions of a multinational
corporation (related parties) and, therefore, reflects the interplay of internal corporate
forces rather than (or in addition to) external market forces. The transfer price may equal
the market (arm’s-length) price by choice, by coincidence, or through the exertion of
external market forces. The arm’s-length price measures the market price, or range of
market prices1, that unrelated firms would use under the same (or similar) facts and
circumstances as the multinational corporation’s internal transaction. To the extent that a
multinational corporation can adjust the transfer price, either within the arm’s-length
range or outside the arm’s-length range under non-compliance2, it can use the transfer
price to improve its global after-tax profit. For example, when effective international
corporate tax rates differ, the multinational corporation can manipulate the transfer price
on intra-firm transactions to shift (at least some) profit to the relatively low-tax country.
This rational behavior reduces the multinational corporation’s global tax burden and
increases its global after-tax profit. Since the transfer price shifts taxable income from
one country to another, there is a zero-sum effect on reported income in each country.
Therefore, if a multinational corporation adjusts its transfer price within the arm’s-length
range (outside the arm’s-length range), taxable profit in the high-tax country is lower
(taxable profit attributable to its business activity in the high-tax country is under-

1

In practice, the arm’s-length price is a range of prices that satisfies the transfer pricing
regulations.
2

Tax avoidance is the minimization of one’s tax burden to the extent allowed by law, which
reflects tax law compliance. Tax evasion is the minimization of one’s tax burden beyond the

2

reported) and higher (over-reported) in the low-tax country. Given the importance of the
relationship between tax rates and the multinational corporation’s transfer price, our
central concern is how multinational corporations adjust the transfer price when relative
international tax rates change.
When tax rates differ, the multinational corporation wants to manipulate the
transfer price to shift profit to the low-tax country. Under centralized decision-making, the
multinational corporation adjusts the transfer price to either the highest or lowest
allowable transfer price, the arm’s-length price, which is an exogenous constraint that is
imposed by the tax authorities. This assumes the arm’s-length constraint is an effective
or strict constraint. In addition, the centralized multinational corporation chooses the
firm-wide optimal output level. This is the Horst (1971), or centralized decision-making,
result. Under a weaker or less effective arm’s-length constraint, non-compliance is
possible and the centralized multinational corporation might choose a transfer price that
lies outside the arm’s-length range.
Centralized decision-making does not generally describe the operations of
multinational corporations, however. Top management delegates some degree of
decision-making authority to division general managements, while retaining other
decisions. Therefore, decentralized decision-making more closely characterizes the
dispersion of decision-making authority in the multinational corporation. Decentralized
decision-making distinguishes between top management and division general
management and provides a context for a meaningful examination of the principal-agent
relationship between them. An agency-theory framework underlies the decentralized
model. Division general managements maximize division profit because it affects their
compensation. That reward scheme corrects the agency problems (agency costs) that
extent allowed by law, which reflects non-compliance with tax law. Non-compliance may also be
the result of taxpayer miscalculation or mistake.

3

associate with the delegation of authority.3 The decentralized decision-making
assumption also permits a comparative static analysis with respect to the transfer price.
Since the model specifies the quantity of intra-firm trade to depend on the transfer price,
top management’s first-order condition defines the optimal transfer price.
We adopt Bond’s (1980) specification of the decentralized multinational
corporation, and complete the comparative static analysis that he began. He assumes
centralized transfer pricing, which means that top management chooses the transfer
price while division general managements choose the quantity of intra-firm trade and the
multinational corporation’s output. The comparative static results support our intuitive
understanding of the relationship between tax rates and the transfer price. When tax
rates differ, the transfer price shifts profit from the high-tax division to the low-tax division
to maximize the multinational corporation’s global after-tax profit, subject to an effective
arm’s-length constraint. The optimal transfer price may be an interior solution rather than
the arm’s-length price, however.
When firms adjust the transfer price to minimize their tax burden, the centralized
multinational corporation might adjust its transfer price to a price outside the arm’slength range. The decentralized multinational corporation also might set the transfer
price outside the arm’s-length range, but it is more likely to choose a transfer price
closer to the arm’s-length boundary, because of the decentralized multinational
corporation’s

internal

constraints.

Therefore,

if

multinational

corporations

are

decentralized, the degree of compliance with the transfer pricing regulations is likely to
be more than that predicted by the centralized Horst (1971) model.

3

Underlying the assumption that top management maximizes the multinational corporation’s
profit, which is the shareholders’ goal, is a perfect board of directors or another means to correct
the agency problems between shareholders and top management.

4

We extend the model to consider negotiated transfer pricing under perfect and
imperfect information, where division general managements choose the transfer price
(as well as the multinational corporation’s output). With perfect information, division
general managements know that their negotiation is a positive-sum game. Therefore,
cooperation dominates a negotiation impasse and the Horst (1971) result emerges; the
transfer price equals the arm’s-length price (under tax law compliance) and the firm-wide
optimal output is chosen. With imperfect information, top management must either
facilitate the division general managements’ learning that the game is positive-sum or
implement a non-monetary reward scheme to promote cooperation. If successful,
division general managements cooperate and the Horst (1971) solution emerges, but if
not successful, a negotiation impasse occurs. With negotiation impasse, top
management sets the transfer price and the centralized transfer pricing solution
emerges.
Our decentralized decision-making analysis shows that centralized decisionmaking dominates decentralized decision-making when tax rates differ, but centralized
decision-making is not generally applicable to the multinational corporation. In the
context of decentralized decision-making and different tax rates, top management
weakly prefers negotiated transfer pricing to centralized transfer pricing, since the profit
potential under negotiated transfer pricing is greater. Also, a comparison of centralized
and negotiated transfer pricing shows that the transfer price is sensitive to who sets it.
An interior solution is more likely under centralized transfer pricing, while the Horst
(1971) solution – a boundary solution – is more likely under negotiated transfer pricing
(assuming an effective arm’s-length constraint).

5

II.

Literature Review

A General Framework
The following model provides a general framework to discuss the existing literature on
transfer pricing as well as the model in Section III. The multinational corporation has two
divisions – the parent company in the home country (country 1) and its wholly owned
subsidiary that is located in and incorporated under the laws of the foreign country
(country 2). Trade flows from the parent to the subsidiary, where this intra-firm trade
reflects the multinational corporation’s horizontal or vertical integration strategy. The
multinational corporation maximizes its global after-tax profit, subject to effective
constraints. The global after-tax or net profit is:

1
dc
Π dc
(1 − t 2 )Π 2fc ,
N = (1 − t1 )Π 1 +
e
where Π 1dc is the domestic currency value of the parent division’s before-tax profit, Π 2fc
is the foreign currency value of the subsidiary division’s before-tax profit, t1 and t2 are
country 1’s and 2’s effective corporate income tax rates, respectively, and e is the
foreign currency price of the domestic currency. Furthermore,

Π 1dc = P1 X 11 + P12dc X 12 − C1 ( X 1 ) and
Π 2fc = P2 Y2 − γ 2 (Y2 ) − P12fc X 12 ,
where the parent produces good 1 ( X 1 ), a tangible intermediate product, the subsidiary
produces good 2 ( Y2 ), a tangible final product,4 X 1 equals the quantity of good 1
produced, X 11 equals the quantity of good 1 sold in country 1 at the market price P1 ,

X 12 equals the quantity of good 1 sold to the subsidiary in country 2 (this is the quantity
of intra-firm trade, which is invoiced and sold at an internal transfer price of P12dc ),

6

X 1 = X 11 + X 12 , C1 equals the parent’s total cost of producing good 1, the subsidiary
sells Y2 at the market price P2 , γ 2 equals the subsidiary’s cost of transforming good 1
into the final good 2,5 and P12fc X 12 equals the subsidiary’s resource cost in terms of the
foreign currency.6
By convention, the subsidiary possesses a fixed coefficient production function
with the coefficient equal to 1; it takes one unit of X 12 to produce one unit of Y2 , so

Y2 = f ( X 12 ) = X 12 . In addition, no outside market for the intermediate good exists, so that
X 11 = 0 and X 1 = X 12 . Also, the subsidiary’s output market exhibits perfect competition,
so that P2 = P2 . Finally, let e = 1 . Therefore, the general model reduces to:

Π N = (1 − t1 )Π 1 + (1 − t 2 )Π 2 ,

(1)

Π 1 = P12 X 12 − C1 ( X 12 ) , and

(2)

Π 2 = P2 X 12 − γ 2 ( X 12 ) − P12 X 12 .

(3)

All variables now are in domestic currency units, since e = 1 .
Centralized Decision-Making
Horst (1971) models the centralized multinational corporation and its transfer pricing.
The basic model in equations (1), (2), and (3) are modified to incorporate the following
assumptions. Horst assumes the multinational corporation faces an import tariff or duty
in country 2, d 2 , on the quantity of intra-firm trade, and the multinational corporation

4

If the subsidiary simply resells good 1 in country 2, good 2 is a tangible intermediate product,
say X 2 .
5

6

If the subsidiary is a reseller, γ 2 is its processing (i.e., packaging, modifying, etc.) cost.
P12fc = e ⋅ P12dc
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exhibits horizontal integration. The subsidiary resells X 12 as good 2, X 2 , and produces
part of X 2 itself, X 22 . Thus, the subsidiary’s before-tax profit is:

Π 2 = P2 X 2 − C 22 ( X 22 ) − γ 2 ( X 12 ) − (1 + d 2 )P12 X 12 ,
where X 2 = X 22 + X 12 , C 22 equals the subsidiary’s on-site cost of producing the
intermediate good, and (1 + d 2 ) P12 X 12 equals the subsidiary’s import cost including the
tariff. To simplify, let d 2 = 0 . Horst assumes that the subsidiary’s processing cost ( γ 2 ) is
zero. Thus, equation (3) becomes

Π 2 = P2 X 2 − C 22 ( X 22 ) − P12 X 12 .7

(4)

Centralized decision-making in the multinational corporation means that the
quantity of intra-firm trade does not depend on the transfer price. Centralized decisionmaking can be characterized as one of the following: (i) The owner-operated
multinational corporation possesses no principal-agent problems, and the owner
chooses the transfer price and quantity of intra-firm trade to maximize Π N ; (ii) Top
management of the multinational corporation chooses the transfer price and quantity of
intra-firm trade to maximize Π N , and no principal-agent problems exist8 so that division
general management follows top management’s instructions perfectly;9 or (iii) The
multinational corporation is the traditional neoclassical firm, or “black box,” with no
decision-makers and agency relationships and the firm chooses the transfer price and
the quantity of intra-firm trade to maximize Π N . Since the multinational corporation

7

Horst (1971) assumes that the subsidiary sells its final good in an imperfectly competitive
market. It is assumed here that the subsidiary sells in a perfectly competitive market. This
assumption does not change Horst’s conclusion, however.
8

Agency costs are zero because top management has implemented a perfect management
control system that corrects all principal-agent problems.
9

In this scenario, there are three decision-making entities in the multinational corporation: Top
management, the parent division general management, and the subsidiary division general
management.

8

operates in different countries, top management typically delegates decision-making
authority to division general managements and a principal-agent relationship exists
between them. Therefore, the centralized decision-making assumption implies the
existence of a perfect management control system that provides the incentives for
division general managements to pursue top management’s goal. The parent and
subsidiary division general managements make decisions at the division level that are
consistent with what top management wants, which effectively and perfectly centralizes
decisions. Thus, top management chooses both the transfer price and the multinational
corporation’s output to maximize Π N . When it changes the transfer price, each division
general management does not respond by changing the quantity of the intra-firm good
supplied or demanded.
Horst (1971) considers how the multinational corporation’s transfer price
responds to changes in tax rates by rearranging the multinational corporation’s, or top
management’s, objective function as follows:

[

{

]}

Π N = (1 − t1 )[− C1 ] + (1 − t 2 ) P2 X 2 − C 22 + (t 2 − t1 )P12 X 12 .

(5)

Focusing on the last term in equation (5), when t 2 > t1 ( t2 < t1 ), top management chooses
the highest (lowest) allowable transfer price to maximize Π N , given its optimal choice of

X 12 . The multinational corporation is implicitly constrained by the arm’s-length price, an
external constraint imposed by the tax authorities that is effective and binding.
Decentralized Decision-Making
Hirshleifer (1956, 1964) considers the domestic divisionalized firm and its transfer
pricing.

He

assumes

decentralized

decision-making,

where

division

general

managements negotiate the transfer price (negotiated transfer pricing) and respond to
changes in the transfer price by adjusting the quantity of the intra-firm good supplied or
demanded. Bond (1980) extends Hirshliefer’s (1956, 1964) decentralized domestic firm
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to the multinational case, where top management chooses the transfer price (centralized
transfer pricing).
In Hirshleifer (1956, 1964) and in Bond (1980), the quantity of intra-firm good
trade depends on the parent’s supply and the subsidiary’s demand. Bond (1980)
formally develops the supply and demand relationships. Given the transfer price set by
top management, each division general management determines its optimal trade. The
parent’s and subsidiary’s maximization problems and first-order conditions are given as
follows:

(1 − t1 )Π 1
Max
s
X 12

(1 − t1 )[P12 − C1' ] = 0

(parent)

,

(1 − t 2 )[P2 − γ 2' − P12 ] = 0 ,

(subsidiary)

P12

(1 − t 2 )Π 2
Max
d
X 12

,

P12

where C1' and γ 2' (marginal costs) are the derivatives of C1 and γ 2 with respect to X 12s
and X 12d , respectively. Taking the total differentials of the first-order conditions gives the
slope of the supply curve,

demand curve,

dP12
*
dX 12d

dP12
*
dX 12s

= C1'' > 0 (increasing marginal cost), and the slope of the

= −γ 2'' < 0 (increasing marginal processing cost). Bond (1980) and

we assume that C1'' and − γ 2'' are constants. Graphically, the multinational corporation’s
internal market is shown in Figure 1.
Equilibrium occurs in the internal market when top management sets the transfer
price at P120 . It sets the transfer price at P120 only when t1 = t 2 .10 The short-side rule

10

When t1 = t 2 , no reason exists to use the transfer price to shift profit from one country to
another. Top management is free to set the transfer price to induce autonomous division general
managements to choose the optimum quantity of intra-firm trade (and output), which it does at
10

applies, so that when top management raises (lowers) the transfer price from P120 , the
multinational corporation is along the upper (lower) portion of the demand (supply)
curve.
In Bond’s (1980) model, top management chooses the transfer price to maximize

Π N , given the division supply and demand relationships. Formally, top management’s
maximization problem is MaxΠ N
P12

. Bond (1980) calculates top management’s
s
d
X 12
( P12 ), X 12
( P12 )

first-order condition and evaluates it at the equilibrium transfer price, P120 . The first-order
condition evaluated at P120 is:

dΠ N
dP12

= X 120 (t 2 − t1 ) .

(6)

P12 = P120

From equation (6), Bond concludes that when t 2 > t1 ( t 2 < t1 ), top management raises
(lowers) the transfer price from P120 to maximize Π N , which is consistent with Horst’s
(1971) conclusion.
In Horst (1971), when tax rates differ the centralized multinational corporation
raises or lowers the transfer price by the maximum amount allowed by tax law. How
much does top management in Bond’s (1980) decentralized multinational corporation
raise or lower the transfer price? Bond answers this question by deriving the optimal
markup and markdown conditions. The optimal markup rate is

P12 − C1' (t 2 − t1 )
,
=
P12
η (1 − t1 )
and the optimal markdown rate is

P120 . Since

∂ΠN
∂ X 12

> 0 and the short-side rule applies, X 120 is the quantity that maximizes Π N .
P12

Also, see Appendix 3 for the derivation of the tax conditions.
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( P2 − γ 2' ) − P12 (t 2 − t1 )
,
=
P12
ε (1 − t 2 )
 ∂X d
where η =  12
 ∂P12
 ∂X s
and ε =  12
 ∂P12

 P12

 X d
 12

 P12

 X s
 12


 is the subsidiary’s transfer price elasticity of demand for X 12 ,




 is the parent’s transfer price elasticity of supply of X 12 . Bond



concludes that when t 2 > t1 ( t 2 < t1 ), the optimal markup (markdown) depends on the
relative magnitude of the tax differential and the transfer price elasticity of demand
(supply).
Bond’s (1980) analysis raises the possibility of an interior solution for the transfer
price. Under centralized decision-making, division general managements do not reduce
the quantity of intra-firm trade (and output), so the multinational corporation chooses the
highest or lowest allowable transfer price — a boundary solution. Under decentralized
decision-making, division general managements may lower the quantity of intra-firm
trade (and output) in response to a change in the transfer price. In that case, top
management trades off the gain in Π N that comes from profit-shifting (minimizing its
global tax bill) with the loss in Π N that comes from a loss in efficiency (resource
misallocation). This tradeoff makes an interior solution within the arm’s-length boundary
possible. Top management, limited by the possible adverse effect of a fall in intra-firm
trade on the multinational corporation’s global after-tax profit, may adjust the transfer
price by something less than the maximum allowed by tax law.
III.

Comparative Static Analysis

Centralized Transfer Pricing
We begin by adopting Bond’s (1980) decentralized model of the multinational
corporation and completing the comparative static analysis. In Bond (1980),

12

decentralized decision-making means that top management chooses the transfer price
(centralized transfer pricing) to maximize the multinational corporation’s global after-tax
profit, while division general managements choose division output to maximize division
after-tax profit. We then conclude with the implications of negotiated transfer pricing.
Model and Analysis
We expand Bond’s (1980) results for the vertically integrated multinational corporation
by completing the comparative static analysis for

dP12*
dP12*
and
. Bond’s (1980) model
dt1
dt 2

appears in equations (1), (2), and (3), where X 12 = X 12s ( P12 ) and X 12' > 0 when the
multinational corporation operates along the internal supply curve, and X 12 = X 12d ( P12 )
and X 12' < 0 when it operates along the internal demand curve. Top management’s firstorder condition implicitly defines the optimal transfer price. The total differential of the
first-order condition is used to calculate the comparative static results, which are as
follows:

dP12* ( P12 − C1' ) X 12' + X 12
=
< 0 , and
dt1
D1

(7)

dP12* ( P2 − γ 2' − P12 ) X 12' − X 12
=
>0,
dt 2
D1

(8)

where D1 < 0 .11 These results apply whether the multinational corporation operates
along the internal supply or the internal demand curve.12
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Appendix 1 derives the results. The results in equations (7) and (8) generalize to non-linear
marginal cost curves that produce non-linear internal supply and demand curves. With non-linear
marginal cost curves, the denominator in equation (7) and (8) is CC rather than D1 , and the
second-order condition is Π 'N' ( P12 ) = CC . See Appendix 1. Therefore, profit maximization implies
that Π 'N' ( P12 ) = CC < 0 . The results in equations (7) and (8) are qualitatively consistent when CC
replaces D1 .
12

Appendix 2 determines the signs of the results.
13

These results confirm our intuitive understanding of the relationship between
international tax rates and the multinational corporation’s transfer price. The transfer
price can be used to shift profits to the lower-tax country to reduce the multinational
corporation’s global tax liability and improve its corporate after-tax profit. For example,
when the multinational corporation operates along the supply or demand curve, an
increase in country 1’s tax rate leads the profit-maximizing multinational corporation to
reduce the transfer price. This shifts some profit to the subsidiary in country 2, reduces
the multinational corporation’s global tax liability, and thereby increases its global aftertax profit.
Internal Profit Constraint and an Interior Solution
In Horst (1971), if the multinational corporation does not face an external arm’s-length
constraint (or if the arm’s-length constraint is less than perfectly effective and not
binding), it adjusts the transfer price to a level that shifts all of the high-tax division’s
profit to the low-tax division (Schjelderup and Sørgard 1995). In that case, the high-tax
division earns zero profit. Under decentralized decision-making, the multinational
corporation faces a different internal profit constraint; no division earns zero (or
negative) before-tax profit when the multinational corporation earns a before-tax profit.13
This ensures that not all of the high-tax division’s profit shifts to the low-tax division, even
if the multinational corporation does not face a binding arm’s-length constraint. This
occurs because top management, under decentralized decision-making, must balance
the profit-shifting gain with the possible resource allocation loss when changing the

13

Schjelderup and Sørgard (1995) suggest that the internal profit constraint of zero is an
appropriate amendment to the Horst (1971) centralized decision-making model, but for a different
reason than discussed in this paper. They argue that, since a negative profit cannot be
repatriated to the parent corporation, the multinational corporation does not adjust the transfer
price by a magnitude that makes the high-tax division earn less than zero profit. This argument
does not consider the fact that some countries allow multinational corporations to carry a loss
that is earned in one fiscal year forward (or backward) as a credit toward their tax liability in a
future (or past) fiscal year, however.
14

transfer price. The reasoning is as follows. Top management of the vertically integrated
multinational corporation cannot choose the transfer price that makes the high-tax
division earn too small a profit, or else too little production occurs. Since the division
production functions interconnect in the vertically integrated multinational corporation
(i.e., Y2 = X 12 ), the high-tax division must produce a large enough division output so that
the multinational corporation’s output and after-tax profit are sufficiently positive. The
high-tax division only produces when the transfer price allows it to earn a profit.
Therefore, the decentralized multinational corporation’s profit-maximizing strategy differs
from the centralized multinational corporation’s, since it maximizes after-tax profit only
when the autonomous divisions have the incentive to produce sufficient output. The
decentralized multinational corporation adjusts the transfer price by less than the
centralized multinational corporation when the arm’s-length constraint does not bind,
which limits the profit shift.
Mathematically, the multinational corporation faces a critical upper and a lower
transfer price ( P12CU and P12CL ). Figure 2 illustrates. The profit-maximizing multinational
corporation does not set the transfer price outside, or at, these critical values. If the
arm’s-length constraint does not bind (i.e., the arm’s-length boundary lies outside, or on,
the multinational corporation’s critical upper and lower transfer prices), the multinational
corporation shifts less profit than, or the same profit as, the tax authorities will allow.14
Negotiated Transfer Pricing
In the centralized transfer pricing analysis, we implicitly assume that top management
knows each division’s “reaction-function” (i.e., the parent’s supply curve and the
subsidiary’s demand curve). Therefore, centralized transfer pricing with its underlying
perfect-information assumption may involve an internal contradiction, however. The

14

Appendix 4 derives the critical upper and lower transfer prices.
15

assumption that top management chooses the optimal transfer price implicitly assumes
that top management has perfect information about its divisions. But, if top management
has perfect information about each division, then no need exists to structure the firm in a
decentralized manner (Hansen and Kimbrell 1991). Top management makes all
decisions from the center and division general managements follow instructions
perfectly, since an all-knowing top management successfully corrects shirking and selfinterested behavior without cost. Therefore, “impacted information”15 underlies a firm’s
choice to decentralize and imperfect information is consistent with decentralized
decision making.
Perhaps no contradiction exists, however. Consider two arguments. First,
negotiated transfer pricing contradicts and, in fact, nullifies the multinational
corporation’s vertical (or horizontal) integration strategy. Under negotiated transfer
pricing in the decentralized model, the multinational corporation becomes a union of
completely independent businesses—a conglomerate. Top management must exercise
at least some central control or the firm disintegrates. Since only two choice variables
exist, the transfer price and output, top management must retain control over at least
one. As in Bond (1980), top management controls the transfer price.
Second, even under negotiated transfer pricing, top management still chooses
the management control system and the transfer pricing policy. That is, although
autonomous division general managements directly choose the transfer price through
negotiation, the profit-maximizing top management chooses the transfer pricing policy
that it expects to yield the transfer price that maximizes the multinational corporation’s

15

Williamson (1975) defines impacted information as an information asymmetry that cannot be
resolved at low cost. With respect to the agency relationship between top management and
division general management, division general managements have division information that top
management cannot learn at low cost.
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global after-tax profit. Under negotiated transfer pricing, top management indirectly
chooses the transfer price. Therefore, centralized transfer pricing is a strategic
simplification that is consistent with negotiated transfer pricing.16
Nevertheless, since negotiated transfer pricing exists in practice (Tang 1979, Wu
and Sharp 1979, Price Waterhouse 1984, Eccles 1985, Chalos and Haka 1990), we
relax the centralized transfer pricing assumption and consider negotiated transfer
pricing. The analysis considers two cases. Each division general management either has
perfect or imperfect information about whether the negotiation is a positive-sum game.
The transfer price negotiation is a simultaneous game, since the negotiated outcome (an
agreement), once concluded, is a mutual and joint decision. Also, the negotiation is a
repeated game, since repeated interaction between division general managements in
the multinational corporation is common.
Perfect Information. Under negotiated transfer pricing, a cooperative solution (i.e., an
agreement prior to the end of the negotiation period) occurs when rational profitmaximizing division general managements realize that they play a positive-sum game.
Division general managements receive rewards based on division profit, so as rational
decision-makers they maximize division profit. The game between division general
managements possesses a positive-sum, which means that a higher after-negotiation
profit exists for at least one division while the other division’s after-negotiation profit is
not lower. If the relatively weaker bargaining division general management faces a
probable negotiation outcome that lowers its profit (and therefore its compensation), it
vetoes the other division general management’s offer. Unless the stronger bargaining

16

This argument ignores the fact that top management cannot control autonomous division
general managements perfectly. It also ignores the fact that negotiated transfer pricing may
influence the multinational corporation’s after-tax profit through other avenues besides inducing
division general managements to choose the centralized transfer price.
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division general management presents another offer that leaves the vetoing division
general management with at least its before-negotiation profit (conflict payoff), a
negotiation impasse occurs. With negotiation impasse, each division general
management receives the profit that it started with, its conflict payoff, or lower.17 If the
relatively stronger division general management offers a concession that makes the
weaker division general management at least not worse off, a cooperative outcome
occurs where the stronger division receives at least some gain in its after-tax profit while
the weaker division receives at least its conflict payoff. A concession leads to
cooperation and some gain for the stronger division general management, which
dominates no gain or a loss.
The bargaining sequence occurs in a two stages. In stage one, division general
managements first cooperate and choose the transfer price and quantity of intra-firm
trade. If an agreement does not emerge before the end of the negotiation period, top
management steps in and sets the transfer price (centralized transfer pricing). Therefore,
cooperation weakly dominates a negotiation impasse,18 and a cooperative solution
obtains. In stage two, the two divisions divide the joint gain in after-tax profit, if any.
Since the bargaining outcome reflects each party’s relative bargaining power (Chalos

17

Top management steps in and chooses the transfer price if a negotiation impasse occurs. In
effect, negotiation impasse leads the centralized transfer pricing result.

18

Let “*” indicate the optimum result under centralized transfer pricing. With a negotiation
impasse, top management chooses the transfer price, P12* , which may lie inside the arm’s-length

boundary. With cooperation, division general managements negotiate a transfer price, P12Neg . , at
the upper- or lower-arm’s-length boundary, P12UAL and P12LAL respectively (this will be shown later).
With an impasse, centralized transfer pricing occurs and the quantity of intra-firm trade is
>

determined by the short-side rule, so that when P12* − P120 , X 12* ≤ X 120 . With cooperation, division
<

general managements choose X

Neg .
12

= X . Therefore, the cooperation solution, P12Neg . = P12UAL or
0
12

P12LAL and X 12Neg . = X 120 , weakly dominates the non-cooperative solution, P12UAL ≥ P12* ≥ P12LAL and
X 12* ≤ X 120 .
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and Haka 1990, Chatterjee and Samuelson 1987, Abdel-Khalik and Lusk 1974, and
Dopuch and Drake 1964), the generalized Nash bargaining solution allocates the joint
gain. Specifically, the relative bargaining strength of division general managements
determines the allocation.
Division general managements’ joint after-tax division profit equals the
multinational corporation’s global after-tax profit, Π N . Therefore, in stage one, division
general managements maximize their joint gain by choosing the highest (lowest)
allowable transfer price when t1 < t 2 ( t1 > t 2 ), ceteris paribus, which is the upper (lower)
arm’s-length boundary, P12Neg . = P12UAL ( = P12LAL ). In addition, they choose the equilibrium
quantity of intra-firm trade, X 12Neg . = X 120 , since it maximizes their joint gain, ceteris
paribus. In a positive-sum negotiation under perfect information, rational division general
managements, who face an incentive system that rewards them based on division
performance, choose a negotiated transfer price at the upper- or lower-arm’s-length
boundary and the centralized output, which is the Horst (1971) or centralized decisionmaking solution.
In stage two, the generalized Nash bargaining solution captures how division
general managements divide the joint gain (see Sopher 1993). Let Π JN.G . measure the
cooperative joint gain in after-tax division profit, where

Π JN.G. = Π JN. New − Π JN.Old

[

]

[

]

= (1 − t1 ) Π 1New − Π 1Old + (1 − t 2 ) Π 2New − Π Old
≥0
2

.

The joint gain is restricted to being greater than or equal to zero, since profit-maximizing
assumption rules out a negotiation impasse.19 The generalized Nash bargaining solution
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>

Under imperfect information, Π JN.G. − 0 .
<
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is as follows: Player A receives share X of Π JN.G . and player B receives share Π JN.G. − X
of Π JN.G . . If player A and B do not cooperate, Π JN.G . ≤ 0 , and each player ends up with its
conflict payoff or lower.
The generalized Nash bargaining problem “maximize[s] the weighted product of
utility gains received by the two players to the bargain” (Sopher 1993, p. 70). Each
player’s utility equals its share of the joint gain, X and Π JN.G. − X , respectively. Let γ be
the parent division general management’s bargaining power, where its complete
dominance (impotence) in the negotiation is denoted by γ = 1 ( γ = 0 ). Similarly, let

β = (1 − γ ) be the subsidiary division general management’s bargaining power, where

(1 − γ ) = 1 [(1 − γ ) = 0]

denotes its complete dominance (impotence).20 An increase in the

parent division general management’s absolute bargaining power matches an equal
decrease in the subsidiary division general management’s absolute bargaining power, or

dγ
dγ
=
= −1 . By convention, the maximization problem that represents the
dβ d (1 − γ )
generalized Nash bargaining process is

(

Max ( X ) ⋅ Π JN.G . − X
X 

γ

)

1−γ

 ,21


which produces the following bargaining solution: X * = γ Π JN.G . (the parent’s share) and

(Π
20

J .G .
N

)

− X * = (1 − γ )Π JN.G. (the subsidiary’s share).22 That is, the bargaining outcome

That is, ( 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 ).
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See Nash (1950, 1953) for his theoretical presentation of the bargaining process. Also see
others who use the generalized Nash bargaining solution in economic applications (e.g., Hoel
1991, Linhart et al. 1989). In this paper, the objective function is maximized subject to the implicit
constraint that d {(1 − t1 )Π 1 } ≥ 0 and d {(1 − t 2 )Π 2 } ≥ 0 .
22

When analyzing the second stage of negotiation, “*” refers to the optimum allocation of the joint
gain.

20

allocates the joint gain in division after-tax profit according to each division general
management’s relative bargaining power as follows:

(

)

Π JN.G. = X * + Π JN.G . − X * = γ Π JN.G . + (1 − γ )Π JN.G . .

(9)

For a domestic firm, Hansen and Kimbrell (1991) show that division general
managements first cooperate and choose their output jointly at the firm’s optimal output
level and the transfer price allocates the gain. In the domestic case, the transfer price
does not affect the firm’s after-tax profit, so it can allocate the gain in stage two of the
negotiation without affecting the firm’s after-tax profit. In contrast, Halperin and Srinidhi
(1991) analyze the case of the multinational corporation that faces different tax rates.
Like Hansen and Kimbrell (1991), they conclude that the transfer price allocates the
gain. In that case, global after-tax profit responds to a change in the transfer price.
Therefore, no guarantee exists that division general managements will choose a
negotiated transfer price on the arm’s-length boundary, since division general
managements’ relative bargaining powers determine the allocation of the joint gain. Only
in the special case where their relative bargaining powers lead to a negotiated transfer
price at the arm’s-length boundary is the joint gain in division after-tax profit (and the
multinational corporation’s global after-tax profit) maximized.
In the multinational case under different tax rates, the assumption that the
transfer price allocates the joint gain is not consistent with the assumption that division
general managements maximize profit. Division general managements should choose
the upper- or lower-arm’s-length transfer price in stage one of their negotiation, and then
use another mechanism to allocate the gain in stage two. That is, the negotiated transfer
price allocates before-tax profit between divisions in a way that satisfies the arm’s length
constraint. Therefore, the before-tax (taxable) profits reported on the parent’s and
subsidiary’s tax returns reflect compliance with tax law. Then division general
managements implement their stage two allocation of the joint gain in after-tax profit
21

between themselves using another means, instead of the transfer price. This allocation
need require actual money payments between divisions.23 Since division general
managements receive rewards based on division performance, division general
managements communicate the negotiated allocation of the joint gain and the resulting
division of after-tax profits to top management. Top management then compensates
division general managements based on that information. To do so, it calculates
alternative division profit measures, for internal purposes only, that are based on the
information communicated by division general managements. Top management then
enters those profits into the corporation’s management compensation formula, so that
division general managements’ quarterly or yearly bonus properly reflects the negotiated
allocation of the joint gain.
Imperfect Information. Hansen and Kimbrell (1991) point out that even though “the
assumption of complete information may be reasonable, there is certainly a need for
additional research to assess the impact of relaxing the assumption” (p. 96).24 That
assumption is relaxed here. Under imperfect information, division general managements
may not know that their negotiation is a positive-sum game. Therefore, believing that the
game is zero-sum, the dominant division general management exercises its full

23

If actual money payments allocate the gain between divisions, those payments may be subject
to taxation.
24

Hansen and Kimbrell (1991) present three reasons why complete information between the
division general managements makes good sense: (1) Top management has the incentive to
assimilate the information to encourage division general managements to choose the centralized
outcome; (2) division general managements are “reasonably informed about their division’s
operating environment even without information being supplied by a central authority” (p. 88); and
(3) since division general managements can communicate with each other and they are rational
and profit-maximizing, they have the capability and the incentive to identify joint cooperative gains
when they exist (pp. 87-88).
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bargaining strength to negotiate the most favorable transfer price possible.25 Since the
relatively weaker bargaining division general management is made worse off by
accepting the dominant division general management’s offer, it rejects the offer. In fact,
since the game is perceived as zero-sum, every offer that makes the stronger division
general management better off seems to make the weaker division general management
worse off. The weaker division general management rejects every offer and a
negotiation impasse occurs. With negotiation impasse, top management sets the
transfer price and the centralized transfer pricing result obtains.
Under imperfect information, top management can facilitate division general
managements’ learning that their negotiation is positive-sum. For example, Hansen and
Kimbrell (1991) suggest that top management can take on “the role of supplying
information to managers” [italics in original] (p. 88) by telling them directly.26 If division
general managements believe top management, then they become aware of the
opportunity to achieve a mutual gain and, in the pursuit of their self-interest (maximum
division profit), they cooperate. The perfect information solution obtains, which is the
Horst (1971) or centralized decision-making result, and then they split the gain according
to their relative bargaining powers.
If division general managements do not believe top management, a time-limit
rule may encourage cooperation. Such a rule will not work, however, since division
general managements remain ignorant of the fact that they face a positive-sum game.

25

This is an extreme case, since it is implicit that division general managements have an
adversarial relationship. In practice, even though they have imperfect information, they know the
nature of the internal dynamic in the corporation. The incentives to be a team player probably
leads the stronger division general management to propose a less extreme transfer price, which
tends to promote a cooperative solution even in the absence of perfect information.
26

Hansen and Kimbrell (1991) argue that top management’s role of information assimilator does
not undermine the firm’s decentralized decision-making structure, since “gathering and
disseminating information does not constitute an infringement on the decision-making rights of
divisional managers” (p. 88).
23

Another option is a non-monetary reward scheme.27 Division general managements
receive a non-monetary reward, such as the use of the multinational corporation’s box
seats at a popular event or the use of its time-share in a tropical vacation spot, when an
agreement is reached.28 Under certain conditions, even though division general
managements do not realize that the negotiation is a positive-sum game, the negotiation
becomes a positive-sum game in their minds through the implementation of the nonmonetary reward scheme.
As long as the weaker division general management expects that its gain from
the non-monetary reward exceeds its loss from accepting the stronger division general
management’s offer, cooperation occurs. Its expected loss is not the expected reduction
in division after-tax profit, but rather the expected reduction in management
compensation that occurs in response to the reduction in division after-tax profit. Since
they have imperfect information, they may not succeed in choosing a transfer price on
the arm’s-length boundary. If, by chance or educated guess, they succeed, a joint gain
occurs after the first negotiation round. This indicates that their negotiation is a positivesum game, which promotes cooperation. Top management does not have to offer the
non-monetary reward thereafter, since the realization of a joint benefit informs division
general managements that they face a positive-sum game. Therefore, the negotiations
possess a momentum of their own. On the other hand, if division general managements
choose a transfer price further from the arm’s-length limit, they realize a joint loss,
indicating that they should move the transfer price in the opposite direction in the next

27

A monetary reward scheme may work as well, but the profit-maximizing top management
chooses the non-monetary reward because it has a lower marginal cost.
28

The non-monetary reward, once received, may be subject to an income tax.
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round. A trial-and-error process ensues, and the transfer price converges on the arm’slength boundary.
The non-monetary reward scheme starts the cooperation in the first round, or in
any subsequent round, only if the non-monetary reward provides enough utility gain to
the weaker division general management to offset its expected compensation loss. If the
non-monetary reward is not high enough, will top management raise the non-monetary
reward to promote cooperation? Top management raises the non-monetary reward to
the point where the expected marginal gain in Π N from cooperation is equal to the
expected marginal loss in Π N from increasing the non-monetary reward. In sum, a
cooperative solution is possible under imperfect information, and is more likely when top
management either provides information to division general managements, uses a nonmonetary reward scheme, or division general managements discover by themselves that
the negotiation is positive-sum.
IV.

Results under the Possibility of Non-Compliance

Throughout our analysis in Section III, we assume that the transfer pricing regulations
are perfectly effective, so multinational corporations comply with them.29 The centralized
and decentralized multinational corporations manipulate the transfer price within the
arm’s-length range to lawfully minimize their global tax burden. In this section, we relax
this assumption and consider the results under a weaker or less than perfectly effective
arm’s-length constraint. This weaker arm’s-length constraint means that the centralized
and decentralized multinational corporations might choose, either knowingly or

29

The arm’s-length constraint is effective when it successfully restricts the transfer price. The
arm’s-length constraint may be effective but not binding for an individual multinational
corporation. For example, a decentralized multinational corporation may choose a transfer price
within the arm’s-length range due to internal constraints; the arm’s-length constraint is effective
but not binding.
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unknowingly, a transfer price that lies outside the arm’s-length boundary, which reflects
non-compliance.
The centralized multinational corporation chooses the transfer price at the
highest or lowest allowable transfer price. Under tax compliance or an effective arm’slength constraint, the transfer price equals either the upper or lower arm’s-length
boundary. With the possibility of non-compliance, the centralized multinational
corporation’s transfer price is indeterminate. If it chooses non-compliance, how far
outside the arm’s-length boundary does it set the transfer price? Kant’s (1988) analysis
suggests a determinate solution under non-compliance. His analysis assumes that the
multinational corporation believes that there is a certain and direct relationship between
how far the transfer price is set outside the arm’s-length range and the likelihood of
being caught by the tax authorities and a penalty being imposed. It also assumes that
the dollar value of the penalty is known. The transfer price is determinate and chosen
outside the arm’s-length boundary when the multinational corporation is not prohibitively
risk averse. When the multinational corporation is unwilling to take the risk of being
caught (or prefers to comply), it complies and sets the transfer price at the upper or
lower arm’s-length boundary.
Under an effective arm’s-length constraint, the decentralized multinational
corporation might choose a transfer price within the arm’s-length range rather than on
the arm’s-length boundary, since it faces an internal constraint (if the arm’s-length range
is narrow and binding, it chooses the transfer price on the arm’s-length boundary). Under
the possibility of non-compliance, the decentralized multinational may choose a transfer
price within, on, or outside the arm’s-length boundary, depending on the slope of its
internal demand and supply curves and the position of the arm’s-length boundary. Refer
to Figure 3, which illustrates a non-compliant transfer price when the slope of the
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demand (supply) curve is very steep and a compliant transfer price when the slope of
the demand (supply) curve is relatively flat.
By comparing the transfer price for the centralized versus the decentralized
multinational corporation under the possibility of non-compliance, it is shown that the
decentralized multinational is more likely to comply. This reflects the fact that the
decentralized multinational corporation faces an internal constraint while the centralized
multinational does not. Consider the case where both the centralized and the
decentralized multinational corporation are identical in every way, except for the
difference in decision-making structure. The centralized multinational that prefers not to
comply chooses a transfer price that lies outside the arm’s-length boundary, while the
decentralized multinational that prefers not to comply faces an internal constraint that
leads to a transfer price that is closer to the arm’s-length boundary than the centralized
multinational’s transfer price (see Figure 4) (except when the internal supply and
demand curves are vertical). Therefore, under a less than perfectly effective arm’slength constraint, non-compliance is less probable for the decentralized multinational
corporation than for the centralized multinational corporation, ceteris paribus, given that
it faces an internal constraint.
When the arm’s-length constraint is less than perfectly effective, non-compliance
with the transfer pricing regulations is possible. Ceteris paribus, an industry that consists
of both decentralized and centralized multinational corporations is more likely to comply,
in general, than an industry that is comprised entirely of centralized multinational
corporations. Therefore, the existence of decentralized multinational corporations in a
particular industry leads to a higher average compliance rate than the industry that
consists only of centralized multinational corporations.
The decentralized decision-making model predicts that the range over which the
profit-maximizing vertically integrated multinational corporation adjusts the transfer price

27

to shift profit is likely to be smaller than the centralized multinational corporation’s range.
Thus, a country’s tax authorities may have less concern with the effect of international
tax differentials on the profit-shifting behavior of decentralized multinational corporations
than centralized multinational corporations. The decentralized vertically integrated
multinational corporation has less room to maneuver the transfer price than the
centralized multinational corporation, so the degree of compliance with the transfer
pricing regulations is higher than predicted by Horst’s (1971) analysis. With greater
compliance with the transfer pricing regulations and, in turn, a truer reported corporate
profit, a country’s tax authorities collect more of the tax revenue that is legally due.
This conclusion may not hold under negotiated transfer pricing, however, since
the decentralized multinational corporation is more likely to choose the (perceived)
highest or lowest allowable transfer price, the centralized decision-making result, rather
than an interior solution. Therefore, a multinational industry that includes centralized
multinational corporations, decentralized multinational corporations that practice
centralized transfer pricing, and decentralized multinational corporations that practice
negotiated transfer pricing, should have an intermediate compliance rate.
V.

Summary and Conclusions

This paper considers how the multinational corporation’s transfer price responds to
changes in international tax rates. The centralized decision-making model produces a
boundary solution for the transfer price, either at the upper or lower arm’s-length price,
when the arm’s length constraint is perfectly effective. The decentralized decisionmaking model may produce an interior solution not on the arm’s-length boundary, since
the decentralized decision-making assumption specifies the quantity of intra-firm trade
as a function of the transfer price.
We first extend Bond’s (1980) model by completing the comparative static
analysis. The results confirm our intuition that the profit-maximizing multinational
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corporation uses the transfer price to shift profit to the relatively lower-tax country in
order to maximize its global after-tax profit, all else equal. Also, the results apply to a
wide range of relative tax rates.
Under decentralized decision-making, the transfer price may lie within the arm’slength boundary, since the multinational corporation’s adjustment of the transfer price
affects division output. Thus, since the decentralized multinational corporation may
choose an interior transfer price, the degree of non-compliance by multinational
corporations is less than that predicted by the centralized Horst (1971) model. In
addition, the decentralized decision-making analysis shows that centralized decisionmaking dominates decentralized decision-making when tax rates differ, but centralized
decision-making is not generally applicable to the multinational corporation.
We then extend the decentralized model by assuming negotiated transfer pricing.
Bond (1980) assumes centralized transfer pricing, where top management chooses the
transfer price and division general managements choose the quantity of intra-firm trade.
Under negotiated transfer pricing, division general managements choose both the
transfer price and the quantity of intra-firm trade. With perfect information, profitmaximizing division general managements negotiate and choose both the firm-wide
optimal output and transfer price. This result is consistent with Horst (1971), where the
transfer price is a boundary solution. In contrast to Halperin and Srinidhi (1991), profitmaximizing division general managements do not use the transfer price to divide the
joint gain from cooperation. They must use alternative accounting to communicate their
negotiated allocation of the profit gain to top management for compensation purposes.
When division general managements have less than perfect information, top
management first must persuade them to cooperate by telling them the negotiation is
positive-sum or through a non-monetary reward scheme. As long as the relatively
weaker bargaining division general management believes that the non-monetary reward
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provides at least as much gain as its loss in management compensation, cooperation
occurs. Through a trial-and-error process, division general managements eventually
choose the firm-wide optimum transfer price, ceteris paribus.
A comparison of centralized transfer pricing and negotiated transfer pricing
reveals that the decentralized multinational corporation’s transfer price depends on who
chooses it as well as the difference in international corporate tax rates (and other
factors). Under both assumptions, the qualitative relationship between the transfer price
and tax rates is the same – the multinational corporation uses it to shift profit to the lowtax country. An interior solution is more likely under centralized transfer pricing, however,
while the Horst (1971) solution – a boundary solution – is more likely under negotiated
transfer pricing. In addition, the profit potential under negotiated transfer pricing is
greater. Therefore, in the context of decentralized decision-making and different tax
rates, top management weakly prefers negotiated transfer pricing to centralized transfer
pricing.
When the arm’s length constraint is less than perfectly effective, non-compliance
is possible. In that case, the centralized multinational corporation’s transfer price is
indeterminate. By including Kant’s (1988) assumptions, the centralized multinational
corporation’s transfer price is determinate. The decentralized multinational corporation’s
transfer price may lie outside the arm’s-length range, but it is likely to be closer to the
arm’s-length boundary than the centralized multinational corporation’s transfer price,
ceteris paribus. Therefore, the compliance rate in an industry with a higher proportion of
decentralized multinational corporations should be higher.
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Appendices
Appendix 1: Derivation of Results
The total differential of top management’s first-order condition is:

− [ AA]dt1 − [ BB]dt 2 + [CC ]dP12 = 0 ,

[(

)

[(

]
+ (P

)

]

where AA = P12 − C1' X 12' + X 12 , BB = P2 − γ 2' − P12 X 12' − X 12 , and

{

( )

CC = (1 − t1 ) 2 X 12' − X 12' C1''
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}

{
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}

2
− C1' X 12'' + (1 − t 2 ) − 2 X 12' − X 12' γ 2'' + P2 − γ 2' − P12 X 12'' 


Assuming that the multinational corporation has linear marginal cost curves
2
''
2
(
= X 12d = X 12'' = 0 ), CC = D1 = 2 X 12' (t 2 − t1 ) + C1'' X 12' (t1 − 1) + γ 2'' X 12' (t 2 − 1) . From


the first-order condition, the comparative static results are:

( )

''
X 12s

( )

dP12* AA
dP * BB
=
and 12 =
.
dt1
D1
dt 2
D1
Appendix 2: Signing the Results
Refer to the multinational corporation’s internal market (Figure 1). When top
management sets the transfer price above (below) the equilibrium price, P12 > P120
( P12 < P120 ), and the multinational corporation is along the subsidiary’s demand (parent’s
supply) curve and the relevant quantity is the quantity demanded (supplied) by the
subsidiary (parent), X 12 = X 12d ( X 12 = X 12s ). When the multinational corporation is along
the demand (supply) curve, the subsidiary’s (parent’s) first-order condition holds,
P2 − γ 2' − P12 = 0 ( P12 − C1' = 0 ), while the parent’s (subsidiary’s) first-order condition is
positive, P12 − C1' > 0 ( P2 − γ 2' − P12 > 0 ). Therefore, along the demand curve

dP12*
dt1
dP12*
dt 2

(P
=

12

d
X 12

=
d
X 12

)

'

− C1' X 12d + X 12d
< 0 and
D1

(7d)

− X 12d
>0,
D1

(8d)

and along the supply curve

dP12*
dt1

=
s
X 12

X 12s
< 0 and
D1

(7s)
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dP12*
dt 2

=

(P

)

'

− γ 2' − P12 X 12s − X 12s
>0,
D1

2

s
X 12

(8s)

where D1 < 0 by the assumption that top management maximizes the multinational
corporation’s global after-tax profit and thus the second-order condition for profit
maximization holds.30
Top management’s first-order condition is:

dΠ N
= (1 − t1 )[( P12 − C1' ) X 12' + X 12 ] + (1 − t 2 )[( P2 − γ 2' − P12 ) X 12' − X 12 ] = 0 , or
dP12
−

(P

(P

2

12

)

− C1' X 12' + X 12

−γ −
'
2

)

P12 X 12'

− X 12

=

(1 − t 2 )
> 0.
(1 − t1 )

The sign of the first-order condition in this form is positive, since

(

(1 − t 2 )
> 0.
(1 − t1 )

(

)

)

When the firm is along the X 12s -curve, P12 − C1' = 0 and P2 − γ 2' − P12 > 0 , and
the first-order condition reduces to:

(P

2

− X 12

)

− γ − P12 X 12' − X 12
'
2

[(

>0.

]

)

Therefore, P2 − γ 2' − P12 X 12' − X 12 < 0 in equation (8s).

(

)

(

)

When the firm is along the X 12d -curve, P2 − γ 2' − P12 = 0 and P12 − C1' > 0 , and
the first-order condition reduces to:

[(

]

)

− P12 − C1' X 12' + X 12
>0.
− X 12

[(

)

]

Therefore, P12 − C1' X 12' + X 12 > 0 in equation (7d).
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In the linear supply and demand curves case, D1 < 0 whether or not the second-order




( )2 (t1 − 1) + γ 2'' (X 12' )2 (t 2 − 1) < 0 , given increasing

'
(t 2 − t1 ) + C1'' X 12'
condition holds. D1 = 2 X 12

marginal costs ( γ 2'' > 0 , C1'' > 0 ), positive national tax rates that are less than one ( 0 < t1 < 1 ,
0 < t 2 < 1 ), and t1 < t 2 ( t1 > t 2 ) when the MNC is along the X 12d ( X 12s ) curve (see Appendix 3 for
the derivation of these tax conditions).
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Appendix 3: The Tax Conditions
In Appendix 2, we saw that when the multinational corporation is along its internal supply
curve, top management’s first-order condition is:

− X 12

(P

2

where

[(P

2

−γ −
'
2

)

P12 X 12'

− X 12

=

(1 − t 2 )
>0,
(1 − t1 )

]

)

(P

− γ 2' − P12 X 12' − X 12 < 0 and

2

(1 − t 2 )
>1
(1 − t1 )

)

− γ 2' − P12 > 0 . Therefore

and

t1 > t 2 when the multinational corporation is along the supply curve.
When the multinational corporation is along its internal demand curve, top
management’s first-order condition is:

[(

)

]

]

(

− P12 − C1' X 12' + X 12 (1 − t 2 )
=
> 0,
(1 − t1 )
− X 12
where

[(P

12

)

)

− C1' X 12' + X 12 > 0 and P12 − C1' > 0 . Therefore

(1 − t 2 )
<1
(1 − t1 )

and t1 < t 2 when

the multinational corporation is along the demand curve.
Appendix 4: The Critical Upper and Lower Transfer Prices
When the multinational corporation is along its internal demand curve, equations (7d)
and (8d) are the comparative static results. By top management’s first-order condition,
since BB = − X 12d < 0 in equation (8d), the profit-maximizing top management chooses a

(

)

transfer price where AA =  P12 − C1' X 12d + X 12d  > 0 in equation (7d). Therefore, the


optimal transfer price lies below the transfer price that makes AA = 0 , where the price
that makes AA = 0 is the critical upper transfer price P12CU (see Figure 2). Since BB is
always negative along the demand curve for the profit-maximizing multinational
corporation, the multinational corporation is restricted to choosing a transfer price where
AA is positive; the optimal transfer price is not at or above P12CU .
'

(

)

When the multinational corporation is along its internal supply curve, equations
(7s) and (8s) are the comparative static results. By the first-order condition, since
AA = X 12s > 0 in equation (7s), the profit-maximizing multinational corporation only

(

)

'
chooses a transfer price on the supply curve where BB =  P2 − γ 2' − P12 X 12s − X 12s  < 0 in


equation (8s). That is, the optimal transfer price is higher than a value that makes
BB ≥ 0 . The critical lower transfer price P12CL , then, is the transfer price that makes

(P

2

− γ 2' −

)

'
P12 X 12s

( )

= − X 12s , or BB = 0 .
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Figure 1:
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Figure 3:

Decentralized Multinational Corporation Under The Possibility of
Non-Compliance and Different Sloped Demand Curves
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